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SOCIAL VISIBILITY AND PARTICULARITY 
IN ASYLUM: GAITAN v. HOLDER AND THE 
IRONIC REQUIREMENT OF SOCIAL 
PERCEPTION TO AVOID PERSECUTION 
Jennifer Hess* 
Abstract: On March 1, 2012, in Gaitan v. Holder, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit held that Oscar Gaitan, a citizen of El Salvador who 
was seeking asylum based on membership in a particular social group, did 
not belong to a group that was sufficiently particular. The court reasoned 
that young El Salvadoran males previously recruited to the MS-13 gang, 
but who were opposed to the nature of gangs, were not visible or particu-
lar enough such that the group could be perceived by society. The Eighth 
Circuit adopted the Board of Immigration Appeals’ new standard for the 
definition of a particular social group, implementing a social visibility and 
particularity requirement. This requirement burdens potential refugees 
by requiring them to be part of a recognizable social group while they are 
simultaneously trying to avoid ill-treatment by the group’s persecutors. 
Introduction 
 By the time Oscar Gaitan turned twelve, he had been recruited by 
members of MS-13, a notorious Salvadoran gang, several times.1 Gaitan 
rebuffed each recruitment attempt, endangering his life and the lives 
of his family in his native El Salvador.2 In 2002, Gaitan sought refuge in 
the United States to avoid what would surely become a life of crime and 
violence in his home country.3 Nevertheless, in 2007, the Department 
of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings against Gaitan 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) for being “present in the United 
States without being admitted or paroled.”4 Gaitan appeared in Immi-
gration Court and conceded removability, but sought to avoid deporta-
tion by claiming asylum.5 In order to claim asylum in the United States, 
                                                                                                                      
*Staff Writer, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice (2012–2013). 
1 See Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d 678, 679 (8th Cir. 2012). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2006); Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 679. 
5 Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 679. 
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a potential refugee must be persecuted as a result of his “race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion.”6 Gaitan argued that his social group consisted of those “young 
males that have been previously recruited by MS-13 and are opposed to 
the nature of gangs.”7 The immigration judge (IJ) denied Gaitan’s re-
quest on the grounds that his testimony was not consistent and inter-
connected enough to be deemed credible.8 Though the Board of Im-
migration Appeals (BIA) ultimately overturned the IJ’s ruling on that 
account, the BIA agreed with the second part of the IJ’s ruling: regard-
less of whether Gaitan could prove the credibility of his testimony, he 
failed to fall into a particular social group for purposes of granting asy-
lum.9 
 Gaitan appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit, and was ultimately denied review.10 The Eighth Circuit agreed with 
the BIA and the IJ in finding that the social group to which Gaitan 
claimed membership was not an acceptable social group to satisfy the 
terms for asylum.11 In agreeing with the BIA, the Eighth Circuit has 
implemented a new standard for qualification to a particular social 
group, effectively limiting the persons who will qualify for asylum.12 
I. The Journey, The Social Group, and the Rejection 
 In 2002, Oscar Gaitan entered the United States to escape re-
cruitment into a gang in his native country of El Salvador.13 Though 
the MS-13 gang members never physically harmed Gaitan in their mul-
tiple recruitment attempts, the members threatened harm to both Gai-
tan and his family if he continued to refuse to join the gang.14 As a re-
sult, Gaitan fled El Salvador and entered the United States without 
inspection or the paperwork necessary to grant him citizenship or asy-
lum.15 
                                                                                                                      
6 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 




11 See id. at 682 (agreeing with the BIA that “Gaitan’s articulated social group is not 
sufficiently narrowed to cover a discrete class of persons who would be perceived as a 
group by the rest of society”). 
12 Id. at 686 (Bye, J., concurring). 
13 See Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d 678, 679 (8th Cir. 2012). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
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 In 2007, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security commenced 
removal proceedings against Gaitan by filing a “Notice to Appear” in 
Immigration Court.16 The government claimed that Gaitan was “re-
movable” from this country under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) because 
he was “present in the United States without being admitted or pa-
roled.”17 In Immigration Court, Gaitan conceded that he was, in fact, 
present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, but 
requested asylum.18 To prove that he should be deemed a refugee, and 
therefore granted asylum, Gaitan needed to demonstrate that he was 
“unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail 
himself . . . of the protection of, that country because of fear of perse-
cution.”19 According to the criteria set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., 
Gaitan needed to fulfill at least one of the possible reasons for inability 
or unwillingness to return to his home country: “race, religion, nation-
ality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”20 
Gaitan argued that in refusing to join the El Salvadoran gang, he had 
become a member of a particular social group and therefore should be 
granted asylum.21 
 The IJ rejected Gaitan’s request for asylum and claim for relief, 
reasoning that Gaitan’s testimony and evidence “[were] not sufficiently 
detailed or cohesive to make a positive credibility finding.”22 The IJ 
found that even if Gaitan’s testimony could be shown to be credible, he 
was not eligible for asylum because he had failed to show that he was a 
member of a particular social group.23 Gaitan appealed to the BIA who, 
after a single-member review, overturned the IJ’s credibility determina-
tion.24 Nevertheless, the BIA upheld the IJ’s ruling that Gaitan had 
failed to show membership in a particular social group, and thus was 
not eligible for asylum.25 
 Although the Eighth Circuit denied the petition to review the case, 
it did issue an opinion in support of the BIA.26 In that opinion, the 
                                                                                                                      
16 Id. 
17 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2006); Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 679. 
18 See Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 679. 
19 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 680. 
20 8 U.S.C. § 1101; see Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 680. 
21 Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 679. 
22 Id. 
23 See id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 See id. at 679–80 (denying the petition for review, but nevertheless issuing an opinion). 
“‘Where . . . the BIA issues an independent decision without adopting the IJ’s conclusions, we 
review only the BIA decision.’” Id. at 680 (citing Constanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749, 753 (8th 
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Eighth Circuit stated that a specific social group must have particular 
and well-defined boundaries and must be sufficiently cohesive so as to 
be recognized by society.27 The majority of the Eighth Circuit found 
that Gaitan’s description of the social group to which he belonged was 
too diffuse and “not sufficiently narrowed to cover a discrete class of 
persons who would be perceived as a group by the rest of society.”28 In-
stead, the majority found Gaitan was indistinguishable from other Sal-
vadorans who have “experienced . . . gang violence.”29 
 In his concurring opinion, Judge Bye cautioned that the adoption 
of social visibility and particularity as requirements for membership in a 
particular social group was arbitrary.30 Although Judge Bye agreed with 
the majority’s ultimate outcome against Gaitan, he did so only because 
the court was bound by precedent.31 Judge Bye, relying on Benitez Ramos 
v. Holder, explained that the arbitrary adoption of the social visibility 
and particularity requirements failed to fully value the social dimension 
of identifiable characteristics of a group.32 As Gaitan argued, social visi-
bility and well-defined boundaries should only be treated as factors for 
consideration.33 
II. The Changing Qualifications of “Social Group” 
 Previously, in order to determine whether a person belonged to a 
particular social group, the court focused its attention primarily on the 
immutability of the characteristic binding the members of the group 
together.34 The criteria used to determine a particular social group was 
not based on the physical visibility of that characteristic to the rest of 
                                                                                                                      
Cir. 2011)). The court gives considerable “‘deference to the BIA’s interpretation of immi-
grant statutes and regulations.’” Id. (citing Puc Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 
2010)). Because “social group” is not explicitly defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), the 
court deferred to “the BIA’s reasonable interpretation of the phrase and will not overturn 
the BIA’s conclusion unless it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’” 
Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 
(1984)). 
27 See Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 681 (citing In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 588 (B.I.A. 2008)). 
28 Id. at 678–79, 682. 
29 Id. at 682 (citing Constanza, 647 F.3d at 754). 
30 See id. 
31 Id. at 682 (Bye, J., concurring) (reluctantly agreeing with the majority, but writing 
separately to “express . . . disagreement with [the Eighth Circuit’s] as-a-matter-of-course 
adoption of ‘social visibility’ and ‘particularity’ as requirements for establishing ‘member-
ship in a particular social group’”). 
32 See id. at 685; Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009). 
33 See Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 681. 
34 See Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d 678, 683 (8th Cir. 2012) (Bye, J., concurring). 
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society, but rather on the social existence of that characteristic.35 For 
asylum purposes, a refugee must show that he or she is a member of a 
particular social group that “share[s] a common, immutable character-
istic . . . that the members either cannot change, or should not be re-
quired to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities 
and consciences.”36 The BIA set forth this definition in its 1985 case, In 
re Acosta, and with small variations, all of the federal circuits adopted 
it.37 Nevertheless, by the time Gaitan’s case was argued before the 
Eighth Circuit, the BIA’s approach to understanding membership in a 
particular social group as a basis for asylum was shifting.38 The ap-
proach was moving towards emphasizing the visibility of the binding 
characteristic to society.39 
 Since 2001, the BIA articulated its new approach in piecemeal 
form, but finally clarified it in 2006 in In re C-A-.40 The approach man-
dated that a group could not be considered a “particular group” that 
would earn asylum without being recognized in the public view or hav-
ing characteristics that would allow for public recognition.41 This was a 
distinct departure from the original definition of membership in a par-
ticular social group for which asylum can be granted.42 The new ap-
proach, lacking any apparent justification, emphasized “social visibility” 
                                                                                                                      
35 See id. at 682–83. 
36 Id. at 680 (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part 
by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987), abrogated by Pitcherskaia v. I.N.S., 118 
F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1997)). This definition maintains consistency with the other grounds of 
persecution such as race, religion, nationality, and political opinion, which are all charac-
teristics that either cannot be changed or are so personal and identifiable that they should 
not be forced to be changed. See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. 
37 Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 683 (Bye, J., concurring) (citing Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging 
Importance of “Social Visibility” in Defining a “Particular Social Group” and Its Potential Impact on 
Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender, 27 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 47, 53 & n.24 
(2008)); see Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233–34 (striving to preserve a resemblance between 
the possible grounds of persecution under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(a): race, religion, na-
tionality, political opinion, and particular social group). 
38 Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 683 (Bye, J., concurring). 
39 See id. at 684. 
40 See id. at 683–84; Constanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749, 754 (8th Cir. 2011); In re C-A-, 
23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 956–57 (B.I.A. 2006) (holding that a persecuted group of “noncrimi-
nal informants” is not a particular social group because a “relevant factor [is] the extent to 
which members of a society perceive those with the characteristic in question as members 
of a social group”). 
41 See Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 681; id. at 685 (Bye, J., concurring); Constanza, 647 F.3d at 
753–54 (holding that applicant-refugee’s claims of belonging to a group of a family that 
had experienced gang violence or of being a person who resisted to gang violence were 
too broad to be perceived as social groups by the rest of society). 
42 Constanza, 647 F.3d at 753 (citing Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 628–29 (8th 
Cir. 2008)). 
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and required “particularity,” and in doing so, created a new standard.43 
This definition raised social visibility and particularity from merely fac-
tors in the broader assessment, to absolute conditions necessary to suc-
cessfully show membership in a particular social group.44 
 In 2011, in Constanza v. Holder and Ortiz-Puentes v. Holder, the 
Eighth Circuit adopted the BIA’s new approach for determining mem-
bership in a particular social group.45 The court implemented the BIA’s 
previous decision in In re S-E-G-, altering the meaning of social group 
with respect to the inclusion of sufficient particularity and visibility to 
the point that “the group is perceived as a cohesive group by society.”46 
Because the decisions in those cases created circuit precedent, the 
judges were bound to the reasoning from those rulings when they later 
considered Gaitan’s case.47 
 After the adoption of the BIA’s new approach to understanding 
particular social groups, the federal circuits split in their acceptance 
and approval of a standard that requires social visibility and particular-
ity.48 The First, Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits all took into account 
visibility and particularity in varying degrees.49 The Fourth Circuit up-
                                                                                                                      
43 See Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 685–86 (Bye, J., concurring). 
44 Id. at 682, 685. 
45 See id. at 682; Constanza, 647 F.3d at 753; Ortiz-Puentes v. Holder, 662 F.3d 481, 483 
(8th Cir. 2011). Although both cases adopted the social visibility and particularity require-
ments to satisfy the criteria for a social group to be granted asylum, neither case explained 
the adoption of the new standard. See Constanza, 647 F.3d at 753; Ortiz-Puentes, 662 F.3d at 
483. The standard created by the cases is a departure from the older standard and thus 
should have been explained so that the Eighth Circuit’s adoption was not merely arbitrary 
and capricious. Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 685–86 (Bye, J., concurring). 
46 See Constanza, 647 F.3d at 752–53 (holding that a Salvadoran male resistant to gang 
violence was not a member of a particular social group because “a social group requires 
sufficient particularity and visibility”); Ortiz-Puentes, 662 F.3d at 483 (holding that three 
siblings who refused to join Guatemalan gangs and were subjected to persecution and 
violence failed to satisfy the “social group” criteria for seeking asylum because the group 
was not sufficiently visible or particular); In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 588 (B.I.A. 2008) 
(holding that Salvadoran youths who resisted gang recruitment failed the “social group” 
criteria due to lack of particular and well-defined boundaries and a level of social visibil-
ity). 
47 See Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 681. 
48 See id. at 685 (Bye, J., concurring). 
49 Fuentes-Hernandez v. Holder, 411 F. App’x 438, 438–39 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding that 
El Salvadorans who “resisted gang recruitment” did not belong to a particular social group 
for purposes of seeking asylum because they could not demonstrate “particularity and 
social visibility”); Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440, 447 (4th Cir. 2011) (finding that “young, 
Americanized, well-off Salvadoran male deportees with criminal histories who oppose 
gangs” do not belong to a particular social group for purposes of seeking asylum because 
that group does not satisfy the criteria of having social visibility or the definition of particu-
larity); Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 862 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that “young 
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held the BIA’s new approach, reasoning that membership in a particu-
lar social group required not just immutability of a characteristic, but 
also that the characteristic provided members with social visibility and 
that the group had a particularity such that its membership was de-
fined.50 Though the Ninth Circuit merely upheld the BIA’s new re-
quirement without incorporation of the previous approach or explana-
tion of its adoption of the new one, the First Circuit ruled that the BIA 
is not barred from considering the group’s visibility when determining 
membership in a particular social group.51 In addition, the Second Cir-
cuit agreed with the BIA’s new approach, and found that a person can-
not claim membership in a particular social group if that group lacks 
social visibility and if no “nexus” can be established “between the harm 
he fears and one of the protected grounds enumerated in [8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(42)].”52 
 In contrast, the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have found the 
BIA’s new approach inconsistent with the previous approach stressing 
immutability and imposed without adequate explanation.53 The Sev-
enth Circuit implied that the BIA conflated the understanding of social 
visibility with a group that is visible in a distinct, external sense.54 In its 
opinion, the court overtly suggested that there is a difference between 
being physically distinguishable and socially visible.55 Taken literally, 
social visibility would not require so much of a sense of distinction as it 
would physical evidence or awareness that can be visibly perceived by 
                                                                                                                      
Honduran men who have been recruited by MS-13 but refuse to join” do not belong to a 
particular social group for purposes of seeking asylum because the group is too large and 
is not visible to the rest of Honduran society); Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 59–60 
(1st Cir. 2009) (finding that “government informants” do not belong to a particular social 
group for purposes of seeking asylum because, when social visibility is relevant criteria, 
only a few people knew that the petitioners’ were informants). 
50 Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 681; Lizama, 629 F.3d at 447. 
51 See Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 685 (Bye, J., concurring); Ramos-Lopez, 563 F.3d at 862; 
Scatambuli, 558 F.3d at 60. 
52 Fuentes-Hernandez, 411 F. App’x at 438–39; see Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 685 (Bye, J., con-
curring). 
53 See Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 685 (Bye, J., concurring); Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 
663 F.3d 582, 603–09 (3d Cir. 2011); Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 365–67 (6th Cir. 
2010); Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009). The Third, Sixth, and 
Seventh Circuits agree with Judge Bye’s concurrence in that the shift of the new standard 
is “arbitrary and capricious” and inconsistent with the previous standard, thus refusing to 
implement the social visibility and particularity requirements without further explanation 
from the BIA. See Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 685 (Bye, J., concurring); Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d 
at 603–09; Urbina-Mejia, 597 F.3d at 365–67; Benitez Ramos, 589 F.3d at 430. 
54 See Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 685 (Bye, J., concurring); Benitez Ramos, 589 F.3d at 430. 
55 See Benitez Ramos, 589 F.3d at 430. 
34 Boston College Journal of Law & Socail Justice [Vol. 33: E. Supp. 
the rest of society.56 It is this literal visibility requirement that the Sev-
enth Circuit accuses the BIA of adopting in its new standard.57 
III. The New Standard and the Irony of Social Visibility 
 Although the Eighth Circuit denied Gaitan’s petition for review, 
the court issued an opinion in support of the BIA’s decision.58 The 
court opined that Gaitan’s perceived social group of “‘young males 
from El Salvador who have been subjected to recruitment by the MS-13 
gang and who have rejected or resisted membership in the gang based 
on personal opposition to the gang’” is not “sufficiently narrowed” to 
satisfy either the particularity or social visibility requirement.59 The 
court was bound by its earlier opinions in Constanza v. Holder and Ortiz-
Puentes v. Holder. 60 In those cases, the Eighth Circuit adopted the BIA’s 
new arbitrary approach to understanding membership in a particular 
social group, holding that a social group must be distinguishable to so-
ciety as a result of sufficient particularity and visibility.61 Nevertheless, 
the BIA’s new approach fails to properly incorporate the original defi-
nition emphasizing immutability of the characteristic.62 The original 
definition maximizes the protection of persons seeking asylum from 
persecution by highlighting the social existence of the characteristic 
rather than the social visibility.63 In contrast, the new approach “evis-
cerates protections” for groups who would previously have satisfied the 
agency’s definition of social group.64 
                                                                                                                      
56 Id. 
57 See id. 
58 Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d 678, 679–80 (8th Cir. 2012). 
59 Id. at 682. 
60 Id. at 681; Constanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749, 753 (8th Cir. 2011); Ortiz-Puentes v. 
Holder, 662 F.3d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 2011). 
61 See Gaitan, 671 F.3d. at 681; id. at 686 (Bye, J., concurring); Constanza, 647 F.3d at 
753; Ortiz-Puentes, 662 F.3d at 483. “At the time that he filed his appeal, Gaitan was correct 
that no panel of this Court had gone so far as to refer to social visibility and particularity as 
requirements. Yet our recent decisions in [Constanza and Ortiz-Puentes] adopted such a 
reading.” See Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 681. 
62 See Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 683, 685 (Bye, J., concurring); Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 
F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233–34 (B.I.A. 1985), over-
ruled in part by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987), abrogated by Pitcherskaia 
v. I.N.S., 118 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1997). 
63 See Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 685–86 (Bye, J., concurring); Benitez Ramos, 589 F.3d at 430 
(“Often it is unclear whether the Board is using the term ‘social visibility’ in the literal 
sense or in the ‘external criterion’ sense, or even-whether it understands the difference.”). 
64 Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 686 (Bye, J., concurring). 
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 The purpose of asylum is to provide refuge to persons who are 
persecuted for a specific reason.65 Previously, the standard was based 
not on the existence of a characteristic, but rather on visible, social rec-
ognition of such a characteristic, putting those who possess the charac-
teristic, despite its social invisibility, at increased risk of violence and 
persecution in their home countries.66 The new approach, expounded 
by the BIA in an “unexplained departure,” and adopted by a number of 
circuits, including the Eighth Circuit, distinguishes membership of a 
particular social group from the other four grounds for persecution.67 
It does this by removing emphasis on the innateness or immutability of 
the characteristic in exchange for emphasis on social perception and 
particularity of the group.68 The characteristic, as opposed to one of 
personal qualification based on identity of the individual, becomes an 
arbitrary test subject to the whim and perception of society.69 
 If Gaitan stayed in El Salvador, he claimed that he would be recog-
nized as a young male who had refused membership into the MS- 13 
gang.70 As a result, Gaitan would be persecuted or harmed because of 
his personal conviction not to join the gang.71 Gaitan would still be visi-
bly recognizable in his home country despite the Eighth Circuit’s opin-
ion that Gaitan’s group had no social recognition that was clearly evi-
dent.72 But even if Gaitan was not visibly recognizable, he still has a 
characteristic that is a shared past experience with other young males, a 
                                                                                                                      
65 See id. at 680 (majority opinion). 
66 See id. at 686 (Bye, J., concurring); Benitez Ramos, 589 F.3d at 430. 
67 See Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 686 (Bye, J., concurring); Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. 
68 See Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 686 (Bye, J., concurring); Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. 
69 See Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 680; id. at 685–86 (Bye, J., concurring) (quoting Nat’l Cable 
& Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (stating that an 
unexplained departure from established precedent like the BIA’s departure from the 
Acosta definition is generally “a reason for holding [the departure] to be an arbitrary and 
capricious change from agency practice”). In Benitez Ramos v. Holder, the court stated that 
under the new definition, “a complete stranger” would need to be able to identify a mem-
ber of a particular social group just from seeing the member on the street. Benitez Ramos, 
589 F.3d at 430. 
70 Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 679. 
71 Id.; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d 678 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(No. 11–1525) (explaining that the “Salvadoran police [have] been unable to control the 
activities of gangs such as MS-13 and, as a result, youths who live in areas dominated by 
gangs ‘simply have no choice’ as to whether to join”). 
72 See Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 682; Benitez Ramos, 589 F.3d at 430 (“If society recognizes a set 
of people having certain common characteristics as a group, this is an indication that be-
ing in the set might expose one to special treatment, whether friendly or unfriendly.”); 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 71, at 9 (“It is now widely recognized that gangs 
such as MS-13 target youths who refuse to join, along with their families, for serious physi-
cal abuse and even death.”). 
36 Boston College Journal of Law & Socail Justice [Vol. 33: E. Supp. 
criteria that should be sufficient to successfully grant him asylum and 
provide him with protection that he would not have by staying in El 
Salvador.73 
 Past cases illustrate a steadiness of persons seeking asylum for fail-
ure to join a gang in their home country.74 This not only continues to 
support the immutability characteristic of the original definition of a 
specific social group through a shared past experience, it also high-
lights the vulnerability and limited options of persons in gang-ridden, 
violent nations.75 Their options become limited to either joining the 
gang or risking persecution and possibly death for failure to do so.76 
Allowing members to avoid continuing the cycle of violence by seeking 
refuge in the United States would decrease the number of individuals 
involved in violence in their home countries and ultimately save lives—
the BIA’s new approach makes this process more difficult, if not impos-
sible.77 A sound BIA approach should take advantage of the immutabil-
ity of the group’s characteristic, expecting the group to strive towards 
                                                                                                                      
73 See Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 679; Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 683 (Bye, J., concurring); Benitez Ramos, 
589 F.3d at 430. Judge Bye’s concurrence states that “the characteristic uniting the group 
must be ‘one that the members of the group either cannot change, or should not be re-
quired to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.’” See 
Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 683 (Bye, J., concurring) (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 
(B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987), abro-
gated by Pitcherskaia v. I.N.S., 118 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1997)). In Benitez Ramos v. Holder, the 
Seventh Circuit “held that former members of the MS-13 gang were a [particular social 
group] under Acosta because that past shared experience ‘is a characteristic impossible to 
change.’” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 71, at 18 (citing Benitez Ramos, 589 F.3d at 
429). 
74 See Constanza, 647 F.3d at 753–54 (holding that applicant-refugee’s claim of belong-
ing to a group of a family that had experienced gang violence or a person who resisted 
gang violence were too broad to be perceived as social groups by the rest of society); Ortiz-
Puentes, 662 F.3d at 483 (holding that three siblings who refused to join Guatemalan gangs 
and were subjected to persecution and violence failed to satisfy the “social group” criteria 
for seeking asylum because the group was not sufficiently visible or particular); Benitez 
Ramos, 589 F.3d at 431 (holding that prior gang membership is not a group that is suffi-
ciently cohesive or socially visible to qualify for asylum); In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 
588 (B.I.A. 2008) (holding that Salvadoran youths who resisted gang recruitment failed 
the “social group” criteria due to lack of particular and well-defined boundaries and a level 
of social visibility). 
75 See Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 686 (Bye, J., concurring); Benitez Ramos, 589 F.3d at 430; 
Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (providing the original definition of a particular social 
group); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 71, at 8. 
76 See Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 679 (noting that “the gang members threatened to harm Gai-
tan and his family if he did not join”); Benitez Ramos, 589 F.3d at 430 (claiming that the 
only option for former gang member sent back to his home country would be to “abandon 
his Christian scruples and rejoin the gang”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 71, 
at 9. 
77 See Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 686 (Bye, J., concurring). 
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inconspicuousness in their home country to avoid persecution until 
they can safely seek asylum in the United States.78 The “young males 
from El Salvador who have been subjected to recruitment by MS-13 and 
who have rejected or resisted membership in the gang” were already 
consistently persecuted against, so their immutable characteristic was 
sufficient to make them recognizable to their persecutors.79 To demand 
particularity and visibility paints an even bigger target on the group 
members’ backs.80 
Conclusion 
 When Oscar Gaitan came to the United States in 2002, he emi-
grated to avoid persecution and to save himself from a life riddled with 
gang violence. Gaitan claimed that he was a member of a particular so-
cial group and that group had characteristics that were immutable. Un-
fortunately, the BIA recently adopted a new standard. Instead of high-
lighting the immutability of the characteristic necessary to satisfy 
membership in a particular social group, the new standard emphasizes 
the visibility and particularity of the group, asking whether the rest of 
society can recognize members belonging to the group based on the 
characteristic. Using the new standard, the BIA determined that Gai-
tan’s characteristic was not sufficiently visible or particular to merit 
granting asylum. The Eighth Circuit agreed, adopting the standard of 
the BIA and implementing it as precedent in the Eighth Circuit. 
 Applying the BIA’s new standard, the Eighth Circuit effectuated an 
arbitrary requirement, which relies on the perceptions of society rather 
than on the immutability of the characteristic binding the members of 
the group together. The new standard makes it more difficult for those 
individuals who fall into a category of a particular social group to suc-
cessfully seek refuge. The new standard forces the persecuted group 
members to take advantage of and bring attention to the visibility of the 
group to society, which is exactly what the group is trying to avoid. 
Members of groups who are being persecuted will do everything in 
                                                                                                                      
78 See id.; Benitez Ramos, 689 F.3d at 430; Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (providing the 
original definition of a particular social group as one emphasizing immutability). 
79 See Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 682; Benitez Ramos, 589 F.3d at 430. In Benitez-Ramos, the court 
points out that the position that the BIA has adopted permits membership in particular 
social group “only if a complete stranger could identify [a member] . . . if he encountered 
[the member] in the street, because of [the member’s] appearance, gait, speech pattern, 
behavior or other discernible characteristic.” Benitez Ramos, 589 F.3d at 430. 
80 See Gaitan, 671 F.3d at 686 (Bye, J., concurring); Benitez Ramos, 689 F.3d at 430; Peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 71, at 9. 
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their power to avoid being recognized by their persecutors, including 
trying to blend into the rest of society. The limitation is their immuta-
ble characteristic, which is what contributed to making them a target 
for persecution in the first place. The particular social group is now 
forced to run the risk of harm and continued persecution in their 
home country due to the lack of visibility of the characteristic in this 
country. Ironically, the precise effort of the particular social group to 
avoid persecution in the group’s home country is what prevents the 
members from successfully seeking asylum in the United States. 
